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TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgment from other jur sdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This Article reviews Texas conflict cases from Texas
state and federal courts during the Survey period from November 1, 2008,
through October 31, 2009. The Article excludes cases involving fed-
eral-state conflicts; intrastate issues, such as subject matter jurisdiction
and venue; and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or sub-
sequent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state-law topic, except for a few con-
stitutional limits, resulting in the same rules applying to most issues in
state and federal courts.
Although no data are readily available to confirm this, Texas is no
doubt a primary state in the production of conflict-of-laws precedents.
This results not only from its size and population, but also from its place-
ment bordering four states, as well as a civil-law nation, and its involve-
ment in international shipping. Only California shares these factors, with
the partial exception of the states bordering Quebec. Texas courts expe-
rience every range of conflict-of-laws litigation. In addition to a large
number of opinions on garden-variety examples of personal jurisdiction,
Texas courts produce case law every year on Internet-based jurisdiction,
prorogating and derogating forum-selection clauses, federal long-arm
statutes with nationwide process, international forum non conveniens,
parallel litigation, international family-law issues, and private lawsuits
against foreign sovereigns. Interstate and international judgment recog-
nition and enforcement offer fewer annual examples, possibly a sign of
that subject's administrative nature that results in only a few reported
cases.
Texas state and federal courts provide a fascinating study of conflicts
issues every year, but the volume of case law now greatly exceeds this
Survey's ability to report on them, a function both of journal space and
authors' time. Accordingly, this Survey period's article focuses on selec-
tive cases.
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on a contract's forum-selection
clause), waiver (failing to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial
service of process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice-of-law questions, see
RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLIcr OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001).
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of notice are purely matters of forum law, this Article will focus primarily
on the issues relating to amenability.
A. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum-selection clause designating
either the optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a
contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction over
the defendant.2 When a contracting party sues in a non-selected forum in
violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, that
is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction.3 Because derogation clauses
attack rather than establish jurisdiction, that topic is discussed in the sec-
tion on Declining Jurisdiction.4
Prorogation clauses tend to be routine because they establish the fo-
rum's jurisdiction. One Survey-period case stood out for its discussion of
a non-signatory's ability to enforce a forum clause. Dos Santos v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc.5 dealt with a wrongful death claim arising from a
helicopter crash in the Amazon jungle in Brazil. The pilot's widow
brought this action against the manufacturer, Bell Helicopter, which then
impleaded Helisul Taxi Aero, LTDA, the Brazilian company which oper-
ated the helicopter. Helisul objected to Texas jurisdiction, and Bell coun-
tered with a Texas forum clause in Helisul's lease agreement for the
helicopter. However, Helisul had leased the helicopter from Bell's re-
lated entity, Textron Financial Corporation, and Helisul objected to Bell's
invocation of an agreement to which it was not a party.6 After a careful
analysis, the federal district court found that the lease agreement had
clear assignment provisions that gave Bell Helicopter-and its parent
Textron, Inc.-the right to enforce the agreement7 and that the lease
agreement's scope was sufficiently broad to cover this indemnity claim.8
The court also rejected Helisul's judicial estoppel claim that Bell could
not assert Texas jurisdiction because it had argued in a prior case that
"personal jurisdiction [over Helisul] does not exist in the United States."9
In this case, jurisdiction did exist.10
In other Survey period cases, courts enforced Texas forum clauses in
(1) TGI Friday's licensing, trademark, and unfair competition disputes
2. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 361 (2d ed. 1992).
3. Id.
4. James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 813-49 (1999); see id.
at 360-61. For a discussion of forum derogation clauses, see infra notes 96-109 and accom-
panying text.
5. 651 F. Supp. 2d 550, 551 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
6. Id. at 552.
7. Id. at 554-56.
8. Id. at 557-58.
9. Id. at 552-54.
10. Id. at 562.
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with former franchisees in California, Washington, and Oregon;" (2)
American Airlines' contract and business tort claims against travel agen-
cies based in New York and British Columbia;1 2 and (3) a Houston-based
tax consulting firm's non-compete and misappropriation claims against a
former employee in Massachusetts who worked mostly in the northeast
United States.' 3
B. TEXAS LONG-ARM AND MINIMUM CONTACrS
Texas uses "limits-of-due-process" long-arm statutes, meaning that the
minimum contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal juris-
diction in Texas.14 The Texas long-arm statutes also apply in Texas fed-
eral courts, except where Congress has enacted a federal long-arm statute
for certain federal law claims.15
1. Commercial Cases
Two Survey period cases demonstrate that a nonresident entering a sin-
gle contract to be performed in Texas may or may not establish jurisdic-
tion. In Fleischer v. Coffey, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that there was jurisdic-
tion over a Nebraska resident for his purchase of a dog in Dallas.16
Fleischer, who lived in California and did business both there and in
Texas, bred, trained, and sold German Shepherd dogs. Coffey, a Ne-
braska resident without Texas contacts, traveled to Texas and purchased
the dog. Coffey closed the deal but left the dog in Texas for additional
training. When the dog arrived in Nebraska, a veterinarian examined it
and determined that the dog had hip dysplasia. Coffey then contacted
Fleischer and demanded a refund and reimbursement of expenses.
Fleischer offered another dog; however, Coffey refused and also failed to
pay the balance owed.' 7 Fleischer then sued Coffey but the district court
in Dallas dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.' 8 Although the trial court
11. TGI Friday's Inc. v. Great Nw. Rests., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 750, 754 (N.D. Tex.
2009).
12. Luxury Travel Source v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 276 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2008, no pet.).
13. Alliantgroup, L.P. v. Feingold, No. H-09-0479, 2009 WL 1109093, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 24, 2009).
14. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977). The primary
Texas long-arm statutes are found at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045
(Vernon 2009), and others are scattered throughout Texas statutes, e.g., TEX. AGRIC. CODE
ANN. § 161.132 (Vernon 2004) (violation of certain agricultural statutes); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 6.305 (Vernon 2006) (nonresident respondents in divorce actions); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. § 823.457 (Vernon 2009) (violations of duties imposed on insurance holding
companies).
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (state long-arms in federal court); FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(1)(D) (federal long-arm statutes). Examples of federal long-arm statutes include 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (2006) for statutory interpleader and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006) for claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
16. 270 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
17. Id. at 336-37.
18. Id. at 337.
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ruled without issuing findings of fact, the court of appeals inferred a trial
court finding that no part of the contract was to be performed in Texas.19
Finding to the contrary regarding the dog's sale and training in Texas, the
court of appeals reversed.2 0 Interestingly, Coffey filed a parallel action
against Fleischer in Nebraska. The Nebraska court stayed that case pend-
ing the Texas ruling on jurisdiction. Had it not stayed the action, or had
the Texas district court's dismissal stood, Nebraska's jurisdiction over
California- and Texas-based Fleischer would have apparently been based
solely on his Internet site.21
Lansing Trading Group, LLC v. 3B Biofuels GmbH & Co. 2 2 reached
the opposite result, albeit on very different facts. Lansing Trading Group
(LTG), a commodities trader, was a Delaware limited liability company
headquartered in Overland Park, Kansas. LTG contracted with 3B Bi-
ofuels (3B), a German entity, for the sale of biodiesel fuel. The fuel was
to be shipped to 3B in six separate shipments from the Port of Houston.
The first two deliveries in July and August 2008 went as planned. How-
ever, the September delivery was late, and when 3B repudiated LTG's
invoice, LTG sued 3B in federal court in Houston.23 The district court
sustained 3B's jurisdictional objection, finding a lack of minimum con-
tacts in spite of its assessment that most, if not all, of LTG's performance
was rendered in Texas.24 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
''merely contracting with a resident of the forum state is insufficient to
subject the nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum
state"25 and then examined a number of cases in which Texas-based con-
tracts did not lead to Texas jurisdiction.26
The holding in Assurances Generales Banque Nationale v. Dhalla27 un-
derscores the need to plead and prove the jurisdictional bases. Nadir
Dhalla was a Canadian citizen who lived in Texas as a resident alien.
Dhalla was involved in an automobile accident (presumably in Texas, al-
though the opinion does not say), and when he was sued, he brought a
third-party claim against his insurer, Assurances Generales, seeking in-
demnification. The trial court found jurisdiction over Assurances Gener-
ales but the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting Dhalla's claim
that the Canadian insurer was foreseeably subject to suit anywhere in the
United States. 28 In so ruling, the court of appeals emphasized several
times that the holding was based more on the plaintiff's failure to plead
or prove jurisdictional predicates than on the idea of an insurer's amena-
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 337 n.2.
22. 612 F. Supp. 2d 813 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
23. Id. at 816-18.
24. Id. at 828-29.
25. Id. at 822.
26. Id. at 822-28.
27. 282 S.W.3d 688 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
28. Id. at 695-701.
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bility to a jurisdiction where a claim arose. 29
Although general jurisdiction-based on a defendant's significant fo-
rum contacts regardless of their relation to the claims-is relatively un-
common, two Survey-period cases employed it. In Construcciones
Integrales del Carmen, S.A. de C.V. v. Goodcrane Corp., a Houston fed-
eral court found general jurisdiction over a Washington-state company
regarding a Mexican corporation's action for nondelivery of a crane pur-
chased through agents in Texas.30 ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. United Dia-
mond Drilling Services, Inc. is a patent infringement suit regarding
oilfield drill bits where a Tyler federal court found general jurisdiction
over a Canadian defendant based on the activities of Ulterra Canada,
ULC, one of its owners.3 '
In two other patent cases, federal courts in the Eastern District of
Texas upheld stream-of-commerce jurisdiction; in both cases the courts
found jurisdiction over Taiwanese defendants who shipped the allegedly
infringing fitness equipment for sale in Texas.32 In a fourth patent case,
the court rejected the plaintiff's "direction" theory of jurisdiction that a
defendant is bound by forum contacts made by other companies but re-
served its ruling pending further discovery.33
Two multi-district litigation (MDL) cases produced opposite jurisdic-
tional results. In re Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Liti-
gation34 originated in the Southern District of New York and was
transferred to the Southern District of Texas under the MDL statute.35
The plaintiffs sued various defendants for fraudulent stock transactions,
alleging claims under federal law, New York law, and Texas law. Defen-
dant Causey, a Texas resident and former Enron chief accounting officer,
moved to dismiss the claims under New York law, arguing that he was not
subject to New York jurisdiction. The court rejected this claim, noting
that federal law provides a nationwide long-arm statute for securities
claims, that the long-arm embraced pendent state claims, and that be-
cause Causey was amenable to Texas jurisdiction, he was amenable under
29. Id. at 698-700. After several references to the plaintiffs' inadequate allegations
and proof, the court of appeals closed, "We conclude, on this record, the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the trial court's implied findings in support of general and specific
jurisdiction." Id. at 700.
30. No. H-08-3427, 2009 WL 1883928, at *1, *8 (S.D. Tex. June 30, 2009).
31. No. 6:07CV251, 2009 WL 2834274, at *1, *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2009).
32. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Horizon Fitness, Inc., No. 5:08CV26, 2009 WL
1025467, at *1, *14 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2009); ATEN Int'l Co. v. Emine Tech. Co., 261
F.R.D. 112, 118-20 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
33. Centre One v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 6:08CV467, 2009 WL 2461003, at *1,
*3-4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009). The court noted, "In simple terms, doing business with a
company that does business in Minnesota is not the same as doing business in Minnesota."
Id. at *4 (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
34. No. H-03-0815, 2009 WL 311311, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2009).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (a venue statute permitting transfer of related cases to
a single district for pre-trial purposes) Please note that the 2010 U.S.C.A. Supp. includes
the text of § 1407(a); however, the text remains identical to the 2006 U.S.C.
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the nationwide long-arm.36 Hildebrandt v. Indianapolis Life Insurance
Co. reached the opposite result, because the case dealt with a diversity
claim without a nationwide long-arm statute.37 The dispute arose from
the plaintiff's establishment of a defined benefit plan only to learn that
the defendant had allegedly misrepresented the federal tax consequences.
Several plan beneficiaries sued, and the various actions were transferred
to the Northern District of Texas under the MDL statute. The court
agreed with the defendant insurer that it was not subject to Arizona juris-
diction, and thus it dismissed the claim.38
In other commercial cases involving challenges to personal jurisdiction,
a Texas bankruptcy court upheld jurisdiction over Mexican residents and
entities for the trustee's claim of fraudulent stock transfer, despite the
defendants' allegations that the transfer occurred entirely in Mexico;39
the Houston First Court of Appeals found no jurisdiction in a Texas resi-
dent's action against a Florida construction company for payment of com-
missions relating to his services as an insurance adjuster in Florida and
held that the defendant's trips to Texas did not create sufficient con-
tacts;40 a Houston federal court found no jurisdiction in a Texas entity's
action to enforce a non-compete agreement against a Massachusetts resi-
dent whose work was mostly out of state;41 and another Houston federal
court denied jurisdiction in a Texas company's secondary claim against a
shipper of power supply units from Nevada.42
2. Non-Commercial Tort Cases
Gathering the conflict-of-laws cases during different Survey periods al-
ways produces aberrations, with some areas of the subject disproportion-
ately represented in one period or another. Sometimes those aberrations
are statistical oddities; other times they are signs of change. This year's
tort cases are more likely a sign of change for two reasons. First, there
appear to be far fewer tort cases in the sampling, both when compared to
past years and when compared to the interstate commercial cases being
litigated in Texas. Second, as the following two cases demonstrate, Texas
36. In re Enron Corp., 2009 WL 311311, at *1-2 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa
(2006)). The Survey period produced two other cases using a federal nationwide long-arm
statute: Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel, No. 3:08-CV-0279-L, 2008 WL 4936488, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 18, 2008) (subjecting defendant Asia Telecom, a New Jersey resident, to jurisdic-
tion in a RICO fraud action); Affco Investments, LLC v. KMPG, LLP, No. H-07-3379,
2008 WL 5070053, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2008) (upholding jurisdiction for a RICO claim
involving a tax shelter but requiring plaintiffs to replead).
37. No. 3:08-CV-1815-B, 2009 WL 398097, at *3, *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009).
38. Id. at *5.
39. Smith v. Lecuona (In re IFS Fin. Corp.), Bankr. No. 02-39553, 2009 WL 3063353,
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2009).
40. Ross v. Nicon Constr., Inc., No. 01-08-00228-CV, 2008 WL 4837562, at *1, *5 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 6, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.).
41. Alliantgroup, L.P., v. Feingold, No. H-09-0479, 2009 WL 2498551, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 12, 2009).
42. U.S. LED, Ltd. v. Nu Power Assocs., Inc., No. H-07-0783, 2008 WL 4838851, at *1,
*7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2008).
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courts appear more inclined to reject tort claims. Phrased another way,
this Survey period produced seventeen noteworthy commercial cases
with jurisdictional challenges and only two such tort cases. In the com-
mercial cases, Texas state and federal courts both upheld and denied ju-
risdiction. In contrast, both tort cases were dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Of course, it could be true that a number of interstate tort
cases are being litigated in Texas without appellate reports (or federal
trial reports) of the jurisdictional challenge. But to the extent the printed
cases reveal overall numbers, tort litigation appears markedly down in
Texas, and Texas courts appear inclined to reject them.
In Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, the parents of a thirteen-
year-old child who died on a river-rafting expedition in Arizona brought
a wrongful death action against a Utah company.43 The trial court denied
Moki Mac's special appearance, finding specific jurisdiction based on de-
fendant's massive marketing efforts directed at Texas residents.4 4 This
included individual solicitations in which Moki Mac gave a "free float" to
customers who signed up a group of ten or more customers. 4 5 The Dallas
Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed, re-
manding the case to the court of appeals for consideration of general ju-
risdiction, because the plaintiffs received the brochure from another
customer rather than directly from the defendants. 46 The court of ap-
peals found no general jurisdiction, although its opinion continued to em-
phasize the defendant's strong intent to serve the Texas market, which
the court used earlier to find specific jurisdiction.4 7 The anomaly here
lies with the Texas Supreme Court's decision, which, though not part of
this Survey period, deserves brief comment. The supreme court based its
opinion not on Texas law but on federal due process, indicating that the
question was one of first impression.48 11 The supreme court's conclusion,
that the boy's death in Arizona lacked a due process connection to the
massive customer solicitation in Texas, compels a rule that negligence
claims may be brought only at the situs of the negligence or in a state
where the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction (such as the defen-
dant's home state).49 While those two forum categories account for the
vast majority of tort cases, it is a strained argument that due process
draws such categorical lines.
In Nabulsi v. Al Nahyan, the plaintiff brought an interesting claim for
damages from his alleged torture at theAiands of his business partner in
the United Arab Emirates (UAE).5 0 The plaintiff, Nabulsi, was a Texas
resident who took a job with Sheikh Issa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu
43. 270 S.W.3d 799, 800 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 803.
46. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 572-73, 585, 588 (Tex.
2007).
47. Moki Mac, 270 S.W.3d at 803-04.
48. See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579-88 (constitutional analysis).
49. Id.
50. No. H-06-2683, 2009 WL 1658017, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2009).
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Dhabi. Nabulsi alleged that Al Nahyan's behavior became increasingly
bizarre after Al Nahyan's father's death, that he began videotaping the
torture of his employees, and that as part of this, Al Nahyan had Nabulsi
imprisoned and tortured for several days.51 Al Nahyan raised objections
as to personal jurisdiction-both amenability and service of process-and
forum non conveniens. The plaintiff attempted to support service of pro-
cess with expert testimony on UAE law, but the federal district court dis-
allowed the expert for his lack of expertise in UAE law5 2 and further
found a lack of adequate service.53 The court also found that in spite of
showing Al Nahyan's periodic presence in Texas, the plaintiff failed to
make a prima facie showing of the contacts necessary for specific or gen-
eral jurisdiction.54 Jurisdictional questions like this occurrence of alleg-
edly horrible actions taken against a Texas resident in a foreign country
are difficult. Texas is a poor litigation site where the evidence is in Abu
Dhabi, but the plaintiff has no other realistic forum.
3. Internet-Based Jurisdiction
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts.55 The test breaks down Internet use into a spectrum of
three areas. One end of the spectrum finds the defendant clearly doing
business in the forum based on contracts entered into with forum re-
sidents; the spectrum's other end is passive websites not involving the
defendant's intentional contact with the forum and not leading to juris-
diction.56 The spectrum's difficult middle involves the forum resident's
exchange of information with the defendant's host computer, and juris-
diction is based on the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of
the information exchanged.57 Five cases during the Survey period consid-
ered Internet arguments and resulted in an interesting profile. Three of
the five cases were defamation claims, and the other two were employ-
ment and patent actions. Courts found no jurisdiction in four of the five
cases, and in the fifth, the patent claim, the court found both general and
specific jurisdiction.
The three Internet defamation claims indicate the increasing difficulty
of establishing jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state. In Chang v. Vir-
51. Id. at *2-3.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id. at *4-11.
54. Id. at *12-23.
55. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The Fifth Circuit adopted the Zippo test in Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333,
336 (5th Cir. 1999). Intermediate Texas appellate courts have used it as well. See, e.g.,
Townsend v. Univ. Hosp.-Univ. of Colo., 83 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002,
pet. denied); Experimental Aircraft Ass'n v. Doctor, 76 S.W.3d 496, 506-07 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.), remanded sub nom. by Doctor v. Pardue, 186 S.W.3d 4
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005).




gin Mobile USA, a Fort Worth resident brought a claim against an Aus-
tralian company which expropriated her web-posted picture for an ad
campaign.58 Alison Chang had her picture taken by her church counselor
who then posted it on Flickr, a public photo-sharing website. Flickr uses
a license agreement that provides for the most unrestricted use available.
Australia-based Virgin Mobile used Chang's image in an advertising cam-
paign "encouraging viewers to 'DUMP YOUR PEN FRIEND' and ad-
vertising 'FREE VIRGIN TO VIRGIN TEXTING." 59 Chang sued
Virgin Mobile in Texas state court for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of
contract, and copyright infringement. The defendant removed the case to
federal court and moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 60
Chang argued that Virgin Mobile's access to a Flickr server located in
Texas was sufficient minimum contacts; however, Flickr also had servers
in California and Virginia, and Chang was unable to prove which server
was implicated in her claim. Even if the Texas server had been used, the
federal district court held that its fortuitous location in Texas was not
purposeful availment in regard to Chang's claims. 61 That is, although Vir-
gin deliberately directed its activity toward Flickr by downloading the
photo from the Flickr website, there was no harm directed at the Flickr
server.62 The court found that even if Virgin Mobile had contracted
under the Flickr license directly with Chang's church counselor (who
posted the picture) and then breached the contract, this alone would not
establish specific jurisdiction.63 The contract did not require Virgin to
perform any obligations in Texas and was centered outside of Texas since
the advertising campaign was launched only in Australian cities.64
HEI Resources, Inc. v. Venture Research Institute is the second defama-
tion claim, also dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.65 HEI Resources, a
Texas corporation, and Colorado resident Charles Cagle sued Venture
Research Institute, a California corporation, for defamation and related
torts for negative postings to investors on an interactive message board
on Venture's website. 66 The court first noted that this was the third time
in a year that Venture had been sued for defamation in the Northern
District of Texas.67 Both of the two prior suits were dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction because the Venture posts were from anonymous
authors. In this case, however, Venture President Bernaldo Bicoy had
written the posts. 68
58. No. 3:07-CV-1767-D, 2009 WL 111570, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009).
59. Id.
60. Id. at *1.
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id. at *4.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. No. 3:09-cv-403-M, 2009 WL 2634858, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2009).
66. Id.




The Venture website offered ten items of Texas-related information.69
In spite of this, the court found that it fell in the middle of the Zippo
interactivity scale, as merely posting information without creating con-
tracts or selling products or services. 70 The court further rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments under the Calder effects test, noting that such juris-
dictional conclusions are rare.71 In a brief discussion of general jurisdic-
tion, the court found that Venture lacked a continuous presence and the
necessary substantial Texas contacts, specifically rejecting Venture's In-
ternet presence as a basis for general jurisdiction.72
The third defamation dismissal was Orhii v. Ornoyele, a Houston man's
claim for a libelous article regarding activities in Nigeria.73 Paul Orhii
was a native of Nigeria and a naturalized United States citizen who lived
in Houston when he filed the lawsuit but has since been appointed to
head the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Con-
trol (NAFDAC) in Nigeria. Defendant Omoyele Sowore was a Nigerian
native and New Jersey resident who operated a website reporting on
Nigerian activities.74 In May 2008, Sowore posted an allegedly libelous
article reporting on a one-billion-dollar out-of-court settlement in Nigeria
against the pharmaceutical company Pfizer. The article claimed that Ni-
geria's attorney general would personally receive ten million dollars from
the settlement and that Orhii was involved in the scheme.75 Sowore did
not conduct business in Texas, had no assets in Texas, and used no volun-
teer writers who resided in Texas. Instead, Sowore relied on Nigerian
sources for his articles and had never used a source from Texas. The fed-
eral district court dismissed the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction,
because the article was clearly focused on Nigeria and the references to
Orhii's residence and work in Texas were "merely collateral." 76
Moving on from defamation, in Qassas v. Daylight Donut Flour Co.,
the federal district court dismissed a Houston resident's claim against
Tulsa-based Daylight Donut Flour Company for breach of his employ-
ment agreement and related claims.77 Daylight regularly conducted busi-
ness with thirty-five franchised stores in Texas, and the court found that
inadequate for general jurisdiction, specifically rejecting Daylight's inter-
active website as a sufficient general contact.78 The court also rejected
69. Id. at *4.
70. Id. at *3 (referring to Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp 1119
(W.D. Pa. 1997)).
71. Id. at *3-6. Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the Venture website targeted
Texas, the court concluded that "the geographic focus of the allegedly defamatory posts
was not Texas or its residents." Id. at *6. "The posts at issue are otherwise related to Texas
only because of the mere fortuity that much of the oil and gas activity in this country is
conducted in Texas." Id.
72. Id. at *6 & n.46.
73. No. 4:08-CV-3557, 2009 WL 926993, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009).
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id. at *1-2.
76. Id. at *34.
77. No. 4:09-CV-0208, 2009 WL 1795004, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2009).
78. Id. at *1, *3-5.
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the plaintiff's claim of specific jurisdiction because the plaintiff had been
hired as the defendant's international marketing representative, a claim
unrelated to Daylight's Texas contacts. 79
Following these four rejections of Internet-based personal jurisdiction,
the court in Autobytel, Inc. v. Insweb Corp. found both general and spe-
cific jurisdiction.80 Autobytel sued Internet Brands and other defendants
for infringing its patent regarding methods for "formulating and submit-
ting purchase requests over a computer network." 8' Rejecting Internet
Brands' jurisdictional objection, the federal district court first found con-
tinuous and systematic contacts based on the defendant's Texas business
license, the presence of its registered agent in Texas, and its filing of Texas
corporation franchise taxes.82 In addition, Internet Brands owned and
operated several websites that allow users to purchase software licenses,
with one website physically present in Texas. The court concluded that
the availability and use of this highly interactive, transaction-oriented
website, combined with the business presence in Texas, established gen-
eral jurisdiction over Internet Brands.83 The court also found specific ju-
risdiction because the allegedly infringing activities were purposefully
directed at Texas residents. 84
C. DECLINING JURISDICTION
Even where all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from
litigating cases involving sovereign foreign governments, cases contractu-
ally directed at other forums, cases where convenience dictates another
forum, and cases parallel for other litigation.
1. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common-law
objection to jurisdiction based on significant inconvenience to one or
more defendants. It is also available by statute in the federal system and
in many states for intra-jurisdictional transfers that do not require dismis-
sal.8 5 Where interstate or international case movement is involved, fo-
rum non conveniens is truly jurisdictional because it involves the forum's
79. Id. at *6.
80. No. 2:07-cv-524, 2009 WL 901482, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009).
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id. at *2.
83. Id.
84. Id. The defendant's website connected Texas customers with Texas auto dealers
for the purpose of purchasing automobiles. A Texas resident using the website could con-
tact Texas dealers to inquire about vehicles for sale in Texas and could also submit financial
data and apply for a loan. The site also provided toll-free telephone numbers and a "Live
Help" link for users. Id. at *3.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006) is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum
objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law provides for in-state venue




declining of otherwise-valid jurisdiction, as well as the dismissal of the
local case, for re-filing in a distinct forum.
Because intra-federal transfers under § 1404 do not implicate conflicts
between states or nations, they are not considered here, even though such
transfers may involve significant distances. This Article is limited to in-
ter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens under the common law which is
available in state and federal courts in Texas under the same two-part test
requiring the movant to show the availability of an adequate alternative
forum and that a balancing of private and public interests favors
transfer.86
Signature Management Team LLC v. Quixtar, Inc. is an action by a
Michigan-based Nevada corporation against a Michigan-based Virginia
corporation alleging various business torts.87 Signature (known colloqui-
ally as Team) engaged in motivational training and sold its materials in
Texas as well as other states. Team filed this action, in state court in Col-
lin County, against Quixtar alleging tortious interference and various
other common-law and statutory claims. Noting that both parties were
based in Michigan, Quixtar moved for a forum non conveniens dismissal
and conceded that the plaintiff could re-file in Michigan. The trial court
granted Quixtar's dismissal motion, but the Dallas Court of Appeals re-
versed, concluding that the factors pointing to Michigan litigation were
not enough to overcome the plaintiff's right to choose the forum.88
The best practice tips for forum non conveniens practice appear in the
briefest opinion of the Survey period. In Dhaliwal v. Vanguard Pharma-
ceutical Machinery, Inc., a Canadian plaintiff brought a personal injury
claim against a Canadian defendant for a job-site injury in which the
plaintiff's hand became lodged in a pharmaceutical blister-pack ma-
86. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 424
(5th Cir. 2001). The private factors look to the parties' convenience and include "the 'rela-
tive ease of access to sources of proof; [the] availability of compulsory process for attend-
ance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witness[es]; possibility of
view of premises, if. . . appropriate ... ; and all other practical problems that make trial . . .
easy, expeditious and inexpensive." McLennan, 245 F.3d at 424 (alterations in original)
(quoting Dickson Marine, Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1999)). The
public factors look to the courts' concerns and the forum state's interests, and include the
administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion, the local interest in having local-
ized controversies decided at home the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum familiar with the law that must govern the action, the avoidance of problems in
conflict of laws problems, and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum
with jury duty. Id. Texas forum non conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (Vernon 2008) applies to personal injury and wrongful death
claims. Common-law forum non conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, governs
all other interstate and international forum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In
re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
87. 281 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. filed).
88. Id. at 670, 675. Quixtar argued that its witnesses were primarily located in Michi-
gan and that the expense of obtaining their testimony by deposition, or alternatively their
attendance in Texas, compelled litigation in Michigan. The court of appeals disagreed,
noting that Quixtar failed to offer any evidence quantifying that cost or otherwise demon-
strating any disadvantage. Id. at 673.
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chine.89 This machine had been shipped directly from China to Vancou-
ver, where the plaintiff lived and where the injury occurred. The federal
district court denied the Canadian defendant's forum non conveniens mo-
tion, because the defendant failed to offer evidence showing that the Brit-
ish Columbia forum was adequate. 0 Specifically, the defendant failed to
show that the Canadian forum would have jurisdiction over all defend-
ants or that the limitations period had not run.91
In other Survey-period cases, Texas state or federal courts granted fo-
rum non conveniens dismissals in: (1) an action regarding an accident in
Mexico that damaged a shipment of industrial gas heaters from Canada, 92
and (2) a maritime claim occurring off the Virginia coast.9 3 Additionally,
Texas federal courts denied forum non conveniens motions in: (1) an ac-
tion for breach of contract in a transaction for property in Mexico, 94 and
(2) an action by a Canadian company against a New York insurer (an
AIG subsidiary) for loss of property located in Longview, Texas.95
2. Derogating Forum-Selection Clauses
The Consent section above discusses forum-selection clauses that es-
tablish local jurisdiction;96 however, somewhat different considerations
arise when the plaintiff sues in a forum contrary to the parties' earlier
choice in a forum-selection clause. These are known as derogation
clauses (in regard to that forum) and instead of justifying the court's re-
tention of the case, derogation clauses require that the court consider de-
clining its otherwise valid jurisdiction over the parties. The Survey period
produced six such cases.
In re International Profit Associates, Inc.97 adds a seeming tautology to
Texas law on challenging forum-selection clauses. Riddell Plumbing con-
tracted with International Profit Associates (IPA) to provide various bus-
iness analyses. The contract had a clause giving Riddell the choice
between binding arbitration or litigation in the state courts in Lake
County, Illinois. When a dispute arose, Riddell chose neither and instead
sued in Texas state court. IPA raised the Illinois forum clause to chal-
lenge jurisdiction, but the trial court rejected the challenge based on Rid-
dell's argument that IPA had not shown it the clause, resulting in
underlying fraud in the agreement. When the court of appeals rejected
IPA's writ of mandamus, IPA filed another petition for writ of mandamus
89. No. H-08-2452, 2009 WL 3414405, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2009) (mem.).
90. Id. at *2.
91. Id.
92. Totran Transp. Servs., Ltd. v. Fitzley, Inc., No. L-08-125, 2009 WL 3079246, at *1,
*4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2009).
93. In re Omega Protein, Inc., 288 S.W.3d 17, 18-19, 24 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
94. Festor v. Wolf, 647 F. Supp. 2d 750, 751-53, 759 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
95. Terroco Indus. Ltd. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. 2:07-CV-437, 2009 WL
901488, at *1-2, *7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2009).
96. See supra Part I.A. .
97. 286 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. 2009).
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with the Texas Supreme Court.98 The supreme court granted the writ
based on existing Texas law that forum-selection clauses are enforceable
unless the opposing party shows "(1) enforcement would be unreasonable
or unjust, (2) the clause is invalid for reasons of fraud or overreaching,"
(3) the clause contravenes strong public policy, "or (4) the selected forum
is seriously inconvenient for trial." 99 Surprisingly, what was new to this
holding was that Riddell could not establish invalidity for fraud or over-
reaching merely by arguing that IPA failed to show it the clause or that it
was otherwise unaware of it. The supreme court conceded that if IPA
had managed to conceal the clause from Riddell, then fraud would have
been established. But all Riddell proved here was that IPA had not di-
rected its attention to the clause, which fell short of Riddell's burden in
challenging the clause.1oo
Two Survey-period cases provide lessons in drafting forum-selection
clauses. Cantex Energy Corp. v. World Stock Exchange, LLC illustrates
that courts will construe ambiguous forum-selection clauses against the
drafter.101 This case arose from San Antonio-based Cantex's agreement
with Arizona-based World Stock Exchange (WSE) in which WSE would
raise capital for Cantex. After a series of subsequent agreements and
payments by Cantex failed to produce any work product from WSE, Can-
tex sued in federal court in San Antonio. WSE objected based on a fo-
rum-selection clause which read that "WSE will be entitled to any legal
fees incurred resulting from the enforcing of this Agreement and will be
litigated in AZ."102 The court, however, agreed with Cantex that the
agreement was ambiguous as to any requirement that Arizona was the
exclusive forum for claims filed by Cantex. Because WSE had drafted
the ambiguous clause, that ambiguity was construed against it, and the
clause failed.103
The second drafting lesson comes from SOURCECORP BPS, Inc. v.
Henderson,104 resting on the important distinction between the terms in
and of. This was an action for damages resulting from the defendants'
alleged pirating of the plaintiff's customers, talent, and confidential and
strategic business information. The parties had been in a business rela-
tionship that included a contract with a forum clause providing that
"[v]enue shall lie in the State and/or Federal Courts of Dallas[,]
Texas."' 05 When the relationship soured, the plaintiff sued in state court
in Dallas, and the defendant removed to federal court. The plaintiff
moved to remand, objecting that the forum-selection clause waived the
defendants' removal rights by designating Texas state courts exclusively.
98. Id. at 922.
99. Id. at 923.
100. Id. at 923-24.
101. No. SA-09-CA-0218-XR, 2009 WL 2407959, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2009).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. No. 3:08-CV-552-L, 2008 WL 4965857 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2008).
105. Id. at *2 (alteration in original).
2010] 469
SMU LAW REVIEW
The federal court agreed and remanded the case, noting that "[f]ederal
district courts may be in Texas, but they are not of Texas." 106
In other derogating forum-clause cases, a Texas state court enforced a
derogating clause designating Delaware or New York courts for a part-
nership dissolution case;107 a Dallas bankruptcy court enforced a derogat-
ing clause to transfer a case to bankruptcy court in New York; 0 and a
Houston federal court rejected a derogating forum clause favoring Ber-
muda courts because of the plaintiffs' expense in litigating there, and be-
cause of Bermuda law's failure to allow class actions.109
3. Parallel Litigation
Parallel litigation is difficult to define, sometimes meaning identical
lawsuits with exactly the same parties bringing the same claims and some-
times meaning two or more lawsuits that may result in claim preclusion
for some or all parties. Parallel litigation occurs both intra- and inter-
jurisdictionally and involves remedies of transfer and consolidation (in-
tra-jurisdictional only), stay, dismissal, and anti-suit injunction, or in
many cases, allows both cases to proceed and the first-to-judgment to
preclude the other.110 The Survey period had five notable parallel ac-
tions, all involving second-filed cases that the courts deferred to the first-
filed action.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. West Coast Life Insurance Co."' offers a
classic scenario of parallel litigation and a straightforward resolution.
The dispute concerned life insurance policies Wells Fargo obtained from
West Coast, although the opinion does not explain Wells Fargo's role in
acquiring these policies. West Coast complained that the policies were
obtained with fraudulent applications and sought to rescind them by fil-
ing a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Florida on August
13, 2008. Wells Fargo asked the federal court in Florida to transfer the
case to federal court in Texas, and then on October 1, 2008, it filed eight
reactive lawsuits in the Northern District of Texas, presumably one action
per policy. West Coast moved to transfer those actions to Florida or,
alternatively, to dismiss them.112
106. Id. (citing Dixon v. TSE Int'l, Inc., 330 F.3d 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also
Hydro Green Energy, LLC v. Concepts ETI, Inc., No. H-09-2271, 2009 WL 3681678, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2009).
107. In re Lehman Bros. Merch. Banking Partners IV L.P., 293 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
108. Manchester, Inc. v. Lyle (In re Manchester, Inc.) 417 B.R. 377, 378 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2009).
109. In re Vistaprint Corp Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 4:08-md-1994, 2009 WL
2884727, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2009).
110. See generally George, Parallel Litigation, supra note 4; James P. George, Interna-
tional Parallel Litigation-A Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 499 (2002).
111. 631 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
112. Id. at 845-46.
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In considering the transfer motions, the Dallas federal court outlined
the first-filed rule which provides that where two substantially similar ac-
tions are filed in federal court, the second-filed forum may decline to hear
the case and transfer it to the first forum.113 The court then noted the
substantial overlap in the Florida and Texas pleadings, the Florida plead-
ings alleging the insureds' fraud and the Texas pleadings complaining of
West Coast's wrongful attempts to rescind the policies based on false alle-
gations of fraud. Wells Fargo argued that: (1) Wells Fargo had a right to
the application of Texas law, and that (2) West Coast was the true defen-
dant but had re-characterized that by filing an anticipatory lawsuit in
Florida. The court, however, was unpersuaded, noting that Wells Fargo
had made the same argument in its motion to transfer filed in Florida. 114
The court also rejected Wells Fargo's argument that West Coast was fo-
rum shopping in Florida and had simply won the race to the courthouse.
The court noted that such an argument, if substantiated, would be
grounds for keeping the Texas action, but found no evidence of West
Coast filing the Florida action in anticipation of Wells Fargo's Texas ac-
tion, which was not filed until a month and a half later. Thus, the court
granted the motion and transferred the eight Texas lawsuits to federal
court in Florida.115
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Novo Nordisk, Inc. provides a
variation on the first-filed rule in patent actions. 116 Sanofi was a German
corporation that had no offices or operations in the United States; how-
ever, its French parent entity did. "Novo [was] a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in New Jersey" and with a Danish
parent, Novo Nordisk A/S. A dispute arose concerning Sanofi's argu-
ment that the NovoFine Needle had infringed on Sanofi's disposable in-
jection needle, which was protected by a United States patent. Novo won
the race to the courthouse with a declaratory judgment action in the
Southern District of New York on January 6, 2009.117
Sanofi responded three days later with a patent-infringement action in
the Eastern District of Texas. Novo moved to dismiss, stay, or transfer
the Texas action, citing the first-filed rule. The court noted that for patent
actions, the law of the Federal Circuit governed the objections to parallel
actions.118 Applying Federal Circuit precedent, the court did an exten-
sive inconvenient-forum analysis and concluded that the first-filed case in
the Southern District of New York had priority. The court refrained,
however, from transferring the Texas case because of unresolved first-
forum issues, including personal jurisdiction. Instead, the court stayed
113. Id. at 846-47 & nn.1-4. It is also appropriate for the second-filed court to dismiss
the case. See George, supra note 4, at 778-80.
114. Wells Fargo, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 848 & n.7.
115. Id. at 848-49.
116. 614 F. Supp. 2d 772, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
117. Id. at 773-74.
118. Id. at 775 n.2. The court also observed the potential for a different result under
Fifth Circuit law. Id. at n.3.
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the action pending the resolution of the first-forum issues that might up-
end first-forum jurisdiction.19
Evanston Insurance Co. v. Tonmar, L.P. is an example of the somewhat
different standards applied for parallel state-federal actions.120 Like the
two cases discussed above, this case involved a declaratory judgment ac-
tion, but unlike the two cases above, the declaratory judgment action
here was second-filed.121 Hitchcock fell through a skylight while trim-
ming trees on top of a warehouse owned by Tonmar. When Tonmar's
insurer, Evanston, denied the claim, Hitchcock sued Evanston in a county
court in Dallas and separately sued Tonmar in state district court in Dal-
las.122 Evanston then filed an action in federal court against Hitchcock
and the Tonmar partners, seeking a declaration of no duty to defend or
indemnify. The court used a thorough Brillhart analysis to conclude that
it should dismiss the second-filed federal action in favor of the earlier
action in a county court at law in Dallas.123 In all three parallel cases-
Wells Fargo, Sanofi, and Evanston-the second-filed court deferred to the
first. Readers should not conclude that this result is inevitable, as the
thorough discussion in each of these cases demonstrates.
In re Viking Offshore (USA) Inc.124 was an adversary claim in a Hous-
ton bankruptcy proceeding. Viking, the debtor, sued Bodewes Winches,
B.V., a Netherlands entity which itself was a successor to a bankrupt
Dutch company, termed "Old Bodewes" by the court. Viking bought
four winches from Old Bodewes to be used in refurbishing Viking's oil
rigs for sale in the bankruptcy proceeding. The winches were never deliv-
ered because of Old Bodewes's bankruptcy in the Netherlands. Viking
brought an adversary action in the Houston bankruptcy court against the
successor entity, termed "New Bodewes," seeking injunctive relief. New
Bodewes moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and, alterna-
tively, asked the court to abstain in deference to the existing bankruptcy
proceeding in the Netherlands. The Houston bankruptcy court found
specific jurisdiction over New Bodewes based on its claim on the winches
but granted its abstention motion.125 Bankruptcy courts have discretion
to abstain from specific proceedings "in the interest of justice, or in the
interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law."1 26 Al-
though this statutory power does not authorize comity for foreign-coun-
try proceedings, federal common law does, using a forum non conveniens
analysis. Based on a careful analysis of forum non conveniens factors, the
119. Id. at 778-82.
120. 699 F. Supp. 2d 725, 732-33 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
121. Readers should note that parallel actions do not invariably involve one or more
declaratory judgment actions. See George, supra note 4.
122. Evanston Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
123. Id. at 732-34 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)).
124. 405 B.R. 434 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008).
125. Id. at 440.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (2006).
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court dismissed the action in deference to the Dutch bankruptcy court. 1 2 7
TrueBeginnings, LLC v. Spark Network Services, Inc. demonstrates a
plaintiff's unsuccessful use of a Texas forum clause to challenge a first-
filed claim in Illinois, asserting that clause not in Illinois but in Texas. 128
The parties in this case were rival online dating services. When Illinois-
based Spark threatened a patent-infringement claim in Illinois federal
court, Dallas-based TrueBeginnings responded by suing Spark and its
Chicago attorneys in Texas federal court. TrueBeginnings accused Spark
and its attorneys of signing on to the TrueBeginnings website and then,
contrary to the use agreement, searching the website for evidence of pat-
ent infringement. 129 The TrueBeginnings user agreement had an exclu-
sive Texas forum clause. Based on this, TrueBeginnings sought a
declaratory judgment arguing that it could not be sued by Spark or its
attorneys anywhere but Texas. The Texas federal court rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that the TrueBeginnings user agreement applied only to
the use of the site and not to patent-infringement claims.130 The plain-
tiff's assertion of the Texas forum clause is not unusual in parallel litiga-
tion. What is unusual is its assertion in Texas to defeat the Illinois forum.
Because courts are not inclined to divest another court of jurisdiction, the
better approach would be to assert the Texas forum clause in Illinois.
That might not be successful either, but it has a better chance than asking
a Texas court, state or federal, to issue a declaratory judgment action
against first-filed litigation elsewhere.
Although not specifically addressing the parallel-litigation issue, the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Zurich American Insurance Co. v.
Nokia, Inc.131 is of tangential interest. In Zurich, various insurers filed
suit in Dallas seeking a declaration that they owed no duty to defend or
indemnify in various lawsuits, all outside of Texas, seeking damages from
Nokia and others for alleged biological injuries from cell phone radia-
tion.132 The supreme court first noted that none of the class action suits
were filed in Texas, that the substantive law relied upon in those suits was
not Texas law, and that every other state and federal court which had
construed "identical claims" for bodily injury held that a duty to defend
existed.133 The supreme court then noted "the importance of uniformity
'when identical insurance provisions will necessarily be interpreted in va-
rious jurisdictions.' 1 3 4 The supreme court concluded that failing to rec-
127. In re Viking Offshore, 405 B.R. at 440-42 (citing the factors in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947)).
128. 631 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
129. Id. at 851-52.
130. Id. at 857-58.
131. 268 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. 2008).
132. Id. at 489. Among the issues considered by the supreme court was the fact that the
underlying class action complaints sought recovery for "bodily injury," thus bringing the
claims within the insurer's duty to defend. See id. at 490.
133. Id. at 496.




ognize the duty to defend would mean Nokia and Samsung, both Texas
corporations, would be deprived of a defense to which parties in other
jurisdictions were entitled.135
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law both in state
and federal courts.136 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the
forum state remains in control. 137 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
only to limited constitutional requirements. 138
Within the forum state's control of choice of law is a hierarchy of
choice-of-law rules. At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, that is,
statutes directing the application of a certain state's laws, based on events
or people important to the operation of each specific law.139 Second in
the choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is,
choice-of-law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dic-
tates otherwise. 140 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now con-
trolled in Texas by the most significant relationship test of the
135. Id. The dissent takes issue with the majority's conclusion and pointedly notes that
some courts have already reached an opposite conclusion. Id. at 504 (Hecht, J.,
dissenting).
136. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
137. The Restatement (Second) creates a presumption against renvoi except for limited
circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 8 (1971). Although
commentators defend the limited use of renvoi, they acknowledge its general lack of ac-
ceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found in statutes
directing the use of renvoi. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAws 134-39 (3d
ed. 2000); WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105, 2.402(b), 4.102(b), 8.106, and 9.103 (Vernon 2009). For fed-
eral courts, Klaxon reiterates the forum state's control of choice of law. 313 U.S. at 497.
138. The due process clause is the primary limit on state choice-of-law rules, requiring a
reasonable or at least minimal connection between the dispute and the law being applied.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 799 (1985); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281
U.S. 397, 407 (1930); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 680 (Tex. 2004).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 9 and comments following;
SCOLEs & HAY, supra note 2, at 145-76; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648. Choice-of-
law limits under full faith and credit are now questionable after Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 6(1) & cmt. a; see e.g., Owens
Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas
wrongful death statute, requiring that the court "apply the rules of substantive law that are
appropriate under the facts of the case," citing TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.031 (Vernon 2008) (as amended in 1997 with the same wording as this provision)).
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1988) (Law of the
State Chosen by the Parties) (allowing contracting parties to choose a governing law,
within defined limits). Texas has adopted § 187. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793
S.W.2d 670, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
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Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 1 4 1 This Survey article is or-
ganized according to this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, fol-
lowed by choice-of-law clauses, and concluding with choice of law under
the most significant relationship test. Special issues such as constitutional
limitations are discussed in the following section. This grouping of cases
results in a discussion that mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with
those of Texas intermediate appellate courts, federal district courts, and
the Fifth Circuit. In spite of this mix, readers should of course note that
because choice of law is a state law issue, the only binding opinions are
those of the Texas Supreme Court. 14 2
A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAw RULES
The Survey period offered one significant case involving a Texas
choice-of-law statute. In Cantu v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained the
relationship of the statutory choice-of-law rules in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to common-law rules under the Restatement. 143 The case in-
volved the plaintiff Cantu's claim for insurance proceeds for her deceased
husband, Jose Martinez. Martinez was a citizen and resident of Mexico
who bought two $500,000 life insurance policies from an agent of the de-
fendant, Jackson National Life (JNL), in Texas. On April 15, 2004, JNL
notified Martinez that his check paying for the policy had been rejected
for insufficient funds. Martinez died in an automobile accident the next
day, and his widow, Alejandra Cantu, immediately submitted the appro-
priate payment to JNL by overnight delivery and filed a claim on the
policy. JNL rejected her claim, and Cantu sued under both Texas and
Mexican law. Because the policies designated Texas law as controlling,
the federal district court dismissed her claims under Mexican law. After
the plaintiff lost a summary judgment motion on her Texas claims, she
appealed as to both the Mexican and Texas claims. As to the dismissal of
her Mexican law claims, she argued that the transaction and resulting
claim had no reasonable relationship to Texas. 14 4
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, noting first that
the Texas Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), found in the Texas Busi-
ness & Commerce Code, has two choice-of-law provisions. The first per-
mits the parties to choose the forum state's law as governing any
transaction that bears a reasonable relation to the forum state; in turn,
this provision looks to the Restatement § 187 to determine the reasona-
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (listing the seven
balancing factors for the most significant relationship test).
142. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue, such as legis-
lative jurisdiction or full faith and credit, or federal questions such as foreign sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 680 (Tex. 2004)
(legislative jurisdiction).
143. 579 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 2009).
144. Id. at 436.
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ble relation.14 5 The second UCC choice-of-law provision states that, for
qualified transactions under UCC § 271.001, the parties may choose a
governing law from any state that bears a reasonable relation to the
transaction; this second provision does not look to the Restatement, but
instead to five situations defining reasonable relation.146 The Fifth Cir-
cuit summarized that if the insurance policy was a qualified transaction
under UCC § 271.001, then the policy's designation of Texas law would
be appropriate if it fell under one of the five situations defining "reasona-
ble relation." If, on the other hand, it was not a qualified transaction
under UCC § 271.001, then Restatement § 187 would control the reason-
able relation issue.147 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the insurance pol-
icy was a qualified transaction because it involved a party's obligation to
pay "consideration with an aggregate value of at least $1 million."148 The
Fifth Circuit then found a reasonable relation to Texas under UCC
271.001's first factor-whether a party to the transaction was a resident of
the chosen jurisdiction. JNL's agent, Cuellar, was a Texas resident. The
plaintiff argued that Cuellar was not a party to the contract, but the Fifth
Circuit correctly pointed out that Cuellar was nonetheless a party to the
transaction. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's claims under Mexican law. 1 4 9
B. CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement permit contracting parties to choose a
governing law,'50 which is reflected in three Survey-period cases. Floyd
v. CIBC World Markets, Inc.151 provides an instructive discussion regard-
ing breadth. The case also points out the Texas practice of issue and
claim splitting, or ddpegage.152 Seven Seas Petroleum Inc. operated oil
and gas fields in Colombia, and after losing money from 1995 to 2000, it
sought additional funds for further exploration and hired CIBC as its fi-
nancial advisor. This resulted in a forty-five-million-dollar joint venture
with Chesapeake Energy Exploration, half of which was Chesapeake's
loan to Seven Seas. When this venture failed, Seven Seas announced its
intention to wind down and sell its interests in Colombia, a task it also
145. Id. at 437 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301(a) (Vernon 2008)).
146. Id. (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. H§ 1.301(c), 271.005(a)(2) (Vernon
2008)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 437-38 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 271.001(1)).
149. Id. at 438; see also Norfolk S. Ry. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., No. 3-07-CV-1905-F, 2009
WL 856340, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009) (applying Illinois law to claims arising from the
plaintiff's purchase of rail cars, and citing generally to UCC § 1-105(1) as honoring contrac-
tual choice-of-law clauses).
150. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.
151. 426 B.R. 622 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
152. Dgpegage is the practice of splitting multiple claims in a lawsuit, or multiple issues
in a claim, and applying different states' laws to the separate issues or claims. Texas law
requires dgpegage, that is, choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis. See id. at 639. See also
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
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assigned to CIBC. In 2002, some of Seven Seas' creditors pursued invol-
untary bankruptcy against the company, and Seven Seas responded by
filing its own Chapter 11 petition. The bankruptcy court appointed Ben
Floyd as trustee, and Floyd filed suit in Houston federal court against
Chesapeake, CIBC, and various Seven Seas directors, alleging negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty. Floyd then dismissed CIBC from the suit
and settled with the remaining defendants.153
Subsequently, Floyd filed the instant action against CIBC for aiding
and abetting Seven Seas' directors' fraud, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
other wrongs. Among other defenses, CIBC argued that New York law
governed, based on a choice-of-law clause in the original engagement let-
ter. That clause read: "This letter agreement will be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York applica-
ble to agreements made and to be fully performed therein."154 1he court
ruled this clause ineffective as to the plaintiff's tort claims, citing Fifth
Circuit precedent construing an identically worded clause.15 5 CIBC fur-
ther argued that the clause should not be read so narrowly, because other
language in the engagement letter broadened its application to "any suit,
action or other proceeding arising out of this letter agreement or the en-
gagement of CIBC World Markets."15 6 The court handily rejected this
argument because that specific language came from the engagement let-
ter's choice-of-forum clause and not its choice-of-law clause.157 With the
choice of New York law not applying to the plaintiff's tort claims, the
court noted the pertinence of the Restatement's tort sections but found
that the record in this complex case was inadequately developed for an
adequate analysis.' 58 The court accordingly deferred the choice-of-law
decision pending further discovery and briefing.159
CMA-CGM (America) Inc. v. Empire Truck Lines, Inc.16 0 was a per-
sonal injury claim arising from a job-site injury. Empire Truck Lines
hired Aguirre to transport cargo, which was stored in a container leased
by CMA, from Longview to the Port of Houston. When Aguirre was
injured by allegedly faulty transport equipment, he sued Empire, CMA,
and others. CMA filed an indemnity cross-claim against Empire pursuant
to those parties' agreement. The trial court interpreted the indemnity
agreement against CMA and dismissed the cross-claim.161 On appeal,
CMA urged the application of Maryland law as designated in the indem-
nity contract; however, Empire objected, arguing that indemnity was a
procedural matter governed by forum law, and further, that Maryland
law violated Texas public policy. The Houston First Court of Appeals
153. See Floyd, 426 B.R. at 630-31.
154. Id. at 639.
155. Id. at 639-40.
156. Id. at 640.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 641.
160. 285 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.-Houston f1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
161. Id. at 11-13.
2010] 477
SMU LAW REVIEW
reversed the trial court's dismissal, finding Maryland law to be substan-
tive and, thus, subject to the parties' choice-of-law agreement. 162 The
court of appeals further held that Maryland law did not violate Texas
public policy merely because it differed.163
Settlement Capital Corp, Inc. v. Pagan'64 was a multi-faceted dispute
arising from a 1995 settlement agreement and its beneficiary's (Pagan's)
subsequent assignment of her rights to various parties. The original
agreement had a non-assignability clause and was governed by New York
law. In 2007, Pagan began assigning her rights in return for various struc-
tured-settlement agreements. Pagan was originally a New York resident
and later lived in Florida. The opinion does not make clear why Texas
became the forum, but it did when Settlement Capital Corporation sued
Pagan and others in 2007. A primary issue was whether New York law
governed the original 1995 agreement's non-assignability feature. The
federal district court rejected New York law, not because of the clause's
invalidity but because the only parties seeking to invoke it were not part
of the 1995 agreement. 65
C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice-
of-law clause, Texas courts apply the most significant relationship test1 6 6
from the Restatement.167
1. Contract-Based Claims
The Survey period produced only two contracts cases governed by the
Restatement, that is, contract disputes not involving a valid choice-of-law
clause. The two cases are set in two federal districts, Houston and Dallas,
and involve different plaintiffs seeking insurance coverage against the
same defendant in unrelated disputes. Pennzoil-Quaker State Co. v.
American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. provides a good dis-
cussion of the law governing insurance coverage claims, highlighting that
for multi-state coverage, the issue is not the location of the underlying
risk in the instant suit but the location of all the risks covered in the pol-
162. Id. at 14.
163. Id.
164. 649 F. Supp. 2d 545 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
165. Id. at 553-56.
166. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Tex. 1990).
167. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test is seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are: "(a) the needs of the
interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determina-
tion of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority, which varies
from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant relationship test
includes the other choice-of-law sections throughout the Restatement.
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icy. 168 Pennzoil sought coverage regarding five pollution lawsuits in
which it was a defendant in Louisiana. The defendant in the instant ac-
tion, American International (AISLIC), had two defenses: first, it owed
no coverage on the fifth suit because Pennzoil failed to give timely notice
of the claim; and second, AISLIC acknowledged coverage in the remain-
ing four actions but contended that they arose from distinct occurrences
and were each subject to the policy's two-million-dollar deductible per
occurrence. Pennzoil argued that the events were sufficiently related as
to constitute a single coverage, requiring a single two-million-dollar de-
ductible. Both sides filed summary judgment motions arguing that both
disputes were contract interpretation issues.169
The first issue, coverage on the fifth underlying lawsuit, did not raise a
conflict-of-laws issue, and AISLIC won that claim.170 On the second is-
sue, regarding the deductible, the defendant AISLIC argued that Louisi-
ana law governed because the other four lawsuits and the underlying facts
were in Louisiana. The court rejected this argument, pointing out that
this policy covered multiple risks for Pennzoil in sixteen states.171 Be-
cause of that, the location of the underlying lawsuits was not determina-
tive.172 Instead, the court turned to the factors of Restatement § 188,
including "the places of contracting and negotiation, and the parties'
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of busi-
ness."' 73 Under those factors, Texas law governed. Although Pennzoil
won the choice-of-law argument, it lost the summary judgment. Under
Texas law, the occurrences were distinct, and Pennzoil owed an eight-
million-dollar deductible.174
Advanced Environmental Recycling Technologies, Inc. v. American In-
ternational Specialites Insurance Co.175 was a second coverage lawsuit
against AISLIC. The underlying dispute was a consolidation of two law-
suits in the Western District of Washington, each seeking damages for
Advanced Environmental's allegedly mold- and fungus- inclined compos-
ite wood products. Advanced argued that AISLIC was obligated to de-
fend those suits under "Coverage B" of the parties' umbrella policy, a
provision that expressly applied to damages not insured in the parties'
underlying policy. AISLIC denied that "Coverage B" applied.176
Before turning to the choice-of-law analysis, the court concluded that
the parties' two argued-for laws, those of Arkansas and Texas, in fact
168. 653 F. Supp. 2d 690, 703 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
169. Id. at 693-96.
170. Id. at 698.
171. Id. at 702-03.
172. Id. at 703 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 193 cmt. a
("The location of the insured risk will be given greater weight than any other single con-
tact" if the risk can be located in a single state. If the insured risk cannot be located in a
single state, other factors determine choice of law)).
173. Id.
174. See id. at 703-09.
175. No. 3:08-CV-0837-O ECF, 2009 WL 3177604 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2009).
176. Id. at *1-2.
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conflicted on the issue of whether the facts alleged in the underlying law-
suits triggered an occurrence in the parties' policy.177 The court then con-
ducted a thorough analysis of the factors in Restatement § 188, the basic
rule for contract cases. Although several factors touched both Arkansas
and Texas, the Arkansas contacts prevailed. Arkansas was the primary
place of the insurance policy's negotiation (including being the place the
policy was delivered), the place of performance if coverage was due, the
situs of Advanced Environmental's headquarters, and the state whose
law the parties observed in drafting the contract.178 The court also
pointed out that Texas courts do not apply one factor of § 188, the place
of the subject matter of the contract, to insurance policies.179
2. Commercial Torts
McCall v. Southwest Airlines Co. 180 illustrates the court's use of a plain-
tiff's venue allegations as a determinative choice-of-law factor. The plain-
tiff was a pilot who filed suit against her employer and her union, the
Southwest Airlines Pilot's Association (SWAPA). McCall is a Southwest
pilot with the rank of First Officer. On December 5, 2007, she was paired
with Captain Austin for a flight from Philadelphia to Nashville. McCall
claims that before departure, each pilot conducted an inspection of the
plane for ice and concluded independently that de-icing was unnecessary.
The flight was uneventful. After landing in Nashville, two deadheading
Southwest pilots, who were flying as passengers on the flight, told Austin
of ice accumulation on the wings. McCall alleges that when she learned
of the incident, she immediately filed an internal safety report, a proce-
dure that protects pilots from disciplinary action in certain limited cir-
cumstances. McCall claims that the Southwest team reviewing her report
ruled unanimously that "she should be returned to work with retrain-
ing."181 Austin filed his report twenty-six minutes after McCall's but was
177. Id. at *6. The issue of false conflicts is seldom discussed in cases. A false conflict
exists when other potentially applicable laws are the same as the forum's, or at least reach
the same result. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLITcr OF LAws §§ 145 cmt. I, § 186
cmt. c (1971). Defining a clear, outcome-changing difference between the forum's and the
foreign law is the first step in conducting a choice-of-law analysis, and the absence of a
clear conflict should result in the application of forum law. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 82345 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Survey period cases involving false conflicts include Tobin v. AMR Corp., 637 F. Supp. 2d
406 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (Texas and Illinois law the same on various claims arising from airline
passenger's heart attack); Lattimore Materials Co., L.P., v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs.
Inc., No. 4:08cv163, 2009 WL 1351099 (E.D. Tex. May 12, 2009) (Texas and Tennessee laws
the same for contract interpretation in insurance coverage case); CMS Energy Res. Mgmt.
Co. v. Quicksilver Res., Inc., No. 2-07-260-CV, 2009 WL 1815776 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
June 25, 2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (Texas and Michigan laws the same
regarding fraudulent inducement claim in the sale of natural gas).
178. Advanced Envtl. Recycling Techs., 2009 WL 3177604, at *7-10.
179. Id. at *9 (citing Reddy Ice Corp. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 145 S.W.3d 337, 345
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet denied); Houston Cas. Co. v. Certain Under-
writers at Lloyd's London, 51 F. Supp. 2d 789, 797 (S.D. Tex. 1999)).
180. 661 F. Supp. 2d 647 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
181. Id. at 650.
480 [Vol. 63
Conflict of Laws
nonetheless fired. According to McCall, in response to Austin's protest
of disparate treatment, Southwest fired McCall, a move she attributed to
Southwest's wish to get rid of Austin, who had a history of bad relations
with Southwest and the union.18 2
In the subsequent grievance, SWAPA obtained reinstatement with a
thirty-day suspension without pay. McCall complains that the settlement
was negotiated without her consent; she sued Southwest and SWAPA in a
Dallas federal court, seeking relief under Illinois law. The case does not
state McCall's argument for Illinois law other than the in-person and tele-
phone discussions there pertinent to this case. The defendants argued for
Texas law. Because McCall's retaliatory and defamation claims were
tort-based, the court employed the basic tort principle in Restatement
§ 145, which includes the place of injury, the place of the conduct causing
the injury, the parties' domiciles, and the place of the parties' relation-
ship.183 The choice was straightforward. While both Southwest and
SWAPA were based in Texas, McCall resided in neither Texas nor Illi-
nois. In particular, the court highlighted McCall's venue allegation that
"a substantial part of the acts giving rise to this action took place in
Dallas."184
Wilson v. Hawker Beechcraft Services was an action seeking damages
for an aircraft accident in Texas. 185 The damage was limited to the plane
and was allegedly caused by faulty equipment. It is not unusual for Texas
state and federal judges to issue brief, even one-sentence, choice-of-law
discussions which are sometimes adequate, perhaps because the parties
have not presented thorough arguments. Often, however, these short
analyses are inadequate. Wilson is an excellent example of a short and
thorough choice-of-law discussion, rendered in a case touching five states.
This opinion was authored by United States District Judge Lynn Hughes,
who has raised succinctness to an art form. She states in full:
Wilson sues for an accident in Texas on an intra-state flight. Wilson
is a Delaware company doing business in Texas. Hawker is from
Kansas. Wilson bought the airplane in Georgia seven months before
the accident from a Maryland company through a Texas broker for
delivery in Texas. Hawker inspected it in Georgia before the sale.
The site of the inspection was fortuitous since the inspector and in-
spected are intrinsically mobile. Texas has the most significant rela-
tionship to Wilson's claims.186
3. Non-Commercial Torts
The Survey period included three noteworthy choice-of-law opinions
involving non-commercial torts in a non-class-action setting. The most
182. Id.
183. Id. at 657.
184. Id. at 658.
185. No. H-08-1652, 2008 WL 5378067, *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2008).




notable case has seen several Survey reports and ends here with a whim-
per in an unreported Fifth Circuit opinion. Cates v. Hertz Corp.187 raised
the question of what law governs vicarious or direct liability of a car
rental company whose customer negligently kills or injures someone in
another state.188 The case began with Matthew Creamer renting a car in
Florida from Hertz. Creamer fell asleep while driving through Texas, se-
verely injuring Texas resident Bobby Cates, who later died. Cates filed a
federal diversity claim against both Creamer and Hertz in a federal court
in Wichita Falls. The trial court held that Texas law governed all claims
and granted summary judgment to Hertz, finding that Hertz was not vi-
cariously liable under Texas law.18 9 At the first trial, the jury found for
defendant Creamer; however, the district court granted a second trial,
which held Creamer seventy percent at fault.190
The parties appealed several issues, including Hertz's dismissal. 191 The
Fifth Circuit upheld the jury verdict against Creamer but reversed Hertz's
summary-judgment dismissal. The Fifth Circuit determined that Florida
law governed Hertz's vicarious liability and, on remand, directed the dis-
trict court to consider whether Florida's dangerous instrumentality doc-
trine applied to non-residents. 192 Noting that this was a question of first
impression under Florida law, the Fifth Circuit instructed the district
court to conduct an "Erie educated guess" on Florida's likely position.193
In 2008, the district court ruled that Florida's dangerous instrumentality
law did apply to Cates's claim.194
Hertz appealed again, and on August 11, 2009, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling on Texas law. 195 In particular, the Fifth
Circuit held that the rental company's situs law could apply to accidents
occurring outside the state where the rental occurred, even if the rental
state's law were more favorable than the state whose resident was injured
or killed. 196
Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Cezar'97 is an example of the court
boilerplating its decision to apply another state's law. The claim arose
from a train-pickup collision in Louisiana and was filed in Texas against
various defendants, including Burlington Northern Santa Fe, whose train
was involved, and Union Pacific, which maintained the right of way. Be-
cause the evidence established Union Pacific's liability to the exclusion of
187. 347 F. App'x 2 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
188. Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third
Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 244-45 (2010).
189. Cates, 347 F. App'x at 3.
190. Id.
191. Cates v. Creamer, 431 F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2005).
192. Id. at 466.
193. Id. (discussed in James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 59 SMU L.
REv. 1039, 1067 (2006)).
194. Cates v. Creamer, No. 7:00-CV-0121-O ECF, 2008 WL 2620097, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
June 27, 2008).
195. Cates, 347 F. App'x at 3.
196. Id. at 4-5.
197. 293 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, no pet.).
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other defendants, the trial court submitted jury instructions only as to
Union Pacific, and the jury returned a plaintiff's verdict.198 On appeal,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals raised the choice-of-law issue sua sponte
and held that Louisiana law governed under Restatement § 145.199 The
court of appeals then noted that the parties had all argued under Louisi-
ana law and that neither party argued application under Texas law.2 0 0
D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
1. Legislative Jurisdiction and Constitutional Limits on State Choice-of-
Law Rules
Similar to the due-process limitation on state long-arm statutes, 201 the
United States Constitution imposes limits on a state's ability to choose
the governing law in its courts. Unlike the limits on state long-arm stat-
utes (which arise only under the due process clause), the choice-of-law
limits arise under several doctrines, including due process (requiring a
reasonable connection between the dispute and the governing law), full
faith and credit (requiring the choice-of-law analysis to consider the inter-
ests of other affected states), and to a lesser extent, equal protection,
privileges and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract
clause. 202 Constitutional problems most often arise when a state court
chooses to apply its own law in questionable circumstances. But, the in-
appropriate choice-of-forum law is not the only conceivable constitu-
tional issue, and even when choosing foreign law, courts must apply
choice-of-law rules with an eye toward constitutional limitations. Many
Survey periods produce no examples of this, but one such example oc-
curred during this period.
Patel v. Pacific Life Insurance Co. involved Dallas residents who in-
vested in a tax shelter that turned out to be illegal, resulting in legal and
auditing expenses. 203 The plaintiffs sued Pacific Life, as the vendor, and
the law firm Bryan Cave for its 1999 opinion favoring the plan. The
plaintiffs brought statutory claims under Texas and California law and
common-law claims not specifying a particular state's law. First address-
ing Pacific Life's various objections to the laws being applied, the federal
district court held that Texas law governed the common-law claims based
on the presumption that forum law governs unless a party pleads other-
wise.204 There were no choice-of-law objections for the plaintiffs' claims
under Texas statutory law, although the court dismissed one for inade-
198. Id. at 803-04.
199. Id. at 807.
200. Id.
201. See supra note 14.
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 9 & cmts.; see also Scoles &
Hay, supra note 2, at 78-109; Weintraub, supra note 1, at 585-648; James P. George, Choice
of Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833, 844-46 (1994).
203. No. 3:08-CV-0249-B, 2009 WL 1456526, *1 (N.D. Tex. May 22, 2009).
204. Id. at *7.
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quate fraud allegations. 205
The legislative jurisdiction issue arose as to the plaintiffs' California
statutory claims. Pacific Life argued that it was not subject to California
law for this Texas transaction, a sale in Texas by a Texas broker to Texas
residents, notwithstanding Pacific Life's principal location in California.
As noted above, legislative jurisdiction has two prongs-legislative intent
and constitutional limitations on that intent.206 The parties' argument
and the court's analysis were limited to California's legislative intent,
which the court found extended to transactions outside California, includ-
ing this one, based on cases from California and a federal court in Florida
construing California's legislative intent for the statute in question.207 In
the irony that often accompanies such holdings, the court then dismissed
the plaintiffs' California claim due to inadequate pleadings.208
2. Notice and Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of another state's or nation's law must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister states' laws.2 0 9 On the other hand, parties must adequately
plead and prove foreign-country law. 2 1 0 One significant Survey-period
opinion underscored the need for timely notice of a party's intent to rely
on foreign law.
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. v. Ministry of Defense of the
Republic of Venezuela211 originated in a federal district court in Missis-
sippi, but its instructiveness on Fifth Circuit practice makes it appropriate
for Survey inclusion. Northrop sued the Republic in connection with a
205. Id.
206. See supra Part II.D.1.
207. Patel, 2009 WL 1456526, at *19.
208. Id.
209. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states' laws
on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must supply
"sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same under
federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S.
218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though FED. R. EVID. 201-the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial notice-
does not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial notice mandate for
American states' laws is subject to FED. R. EVID. 201(b)'s provision for proof of matters
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(b). That is, federal courts may take judicial
notice of American states' laws from (1) official statutory and case reports, (2) widely-used
unofficial versions, or (3) copies, all subject to evidentiary rules on authentication and best
evidence.
210. TEX. R. EvID. 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or other rea-
sonable notice at least thirty days before trial, including all written materials or sources
offered as proof. For non-English originals, parties must provide copies of both the origi-
nal and the English translation. Sources include affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises, and
any other material source, whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not other-
wise admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. Federal practice is similar. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 44.1.
211. 575 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2009).
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contract dispute. 212 During the litigation, one of the Republic's attorneys
agreed to settle the case with the Republic, paying Northrop seventy mil-
lion dollars.213 The district court accepted the settlement and entered an
order of dismissal in October 2005.214 Five days after the dismissal, the
Republic protested the settlement, contending the attorney had no au-
thority to settle on its behalf, and it filed a motion to vacate the order of
dismissal.215 In April 2007, the Republic gave notice that it intended to
rely on the law of Venezuela with respect to the scope of the attorney's
authority.216 The district court held that the notice of reliance on foreign
law, provided eighteen months after the filing of the motion to vacate,
was untimely. 217
In reversing, the Fifth Circuit first noted that, because the federal rules
give a court discretion in determining reasonable notice, the decision can
be reversed only for abuse of discretion, and the purpose is to "avoid
unfair surprise."218 While conceding eighteen months was an extended
delay, the Fifth Circuit based its reversal on the absence of any proof of
unfair surprise.219 The Fifth Circuit noted the extenuating circumstances
justifying the delay-the attorney who allegedly had no authority to enter
into the settlement was the Republic's attorney, and he had to be re-
placed. 220 Another turning point was the Fifth Circuit's finding Venezue-
lan law as crucial to a resolution of the case since the validity of the
settlement turned on Venezuelan law. 2 2 1
3. Federal Choice-of-Law Rules
Although state law controls choice of law in most state and federal
courts, federal law has choice-of-law rules, both statutory222 and com-
mon-law, in matters such as admiralty cases.223 Although the Survey pe-
riod produced a number of admiralty cases, only one had a noteworthy
choice-of-law discussion. Bourg v. BT Operating Co. 2 2 4 provides a con-
cise example of the court's solution when parties fail to support their
choice-of-law arguments. In non-maritime actions, a failure to prove the
basis for which a state's law governs results in a default to forum law. 2 2 5




216. Id. at 495-96; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 ("A party who intends to raise an issue
about a foreign country's law must give notice by a pleading or other writing.").
217. Northrop Grumman Ship Sys., 575 F.3d at 496.
218. Id. at 496-97.
219. Id. at 497.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006) (providing for choice of law for rates of interest
charged by federally regulated banking associations); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (provid-
ing for choice of law in claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
223. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
224. No. H-08-0596, 2009 WL 960011 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2009).
225. Id. at *3-5.
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Admiralty and maritime claims, however, differ in that default.
Bourg was a claim for injury while working on an oil-rig barge on Eu-
gene Island, off the coast of Louisiana. Bourg sued in Houston federal
court under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,2 2 6 which provides
that gaps in the Act should be filled by "the law of the adjacent state." 227
In turn, federal common law provides a four-factor test to identify the
adjacent state: "(1) geographic proximity," (2) federal agency opinions
regarding the platform's proximity to which state's coast, "(3) prior court
determinations, and (4) projected boundaries." 2 2 8 When the defendants
moved for summary judgment, all parties agreed that state negligence law
governed as a surrogate to federal law but disagreed as to which state.
Two defendants failed to address choice of law and simply argued under
Texas law in their summary judgment motions. Another defendant ar-
gued for summary judgment under both Texas and Louisiana law. Bourg
argued against summary judgment under Louisiana law but offered no
argument as to why it controlled. Using a map from the Department of
the Interior, the court took on judicial notice that Eugene Island was "di-
rectly south of St. Mary and St. Martin Parishes" in Louisiana, thus point-
ing to Louisiana law.2 2 9
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas con-
flict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Texas recognizes two methods of en-
forcing foreign judgments: the common-law method using the foreign
judgment as the basis for a local lawsuit,230 and, since 1981, the more
direct procedure under the two uniform judgments acts.231 Section
226. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006).
227. Bourg, 2009 WL 960011, at *3 (citing Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 862
F.2d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 1989); 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1988)).
228. Id. at *4 (citing Snyder Oil Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 208 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir.
2000)).
229. Id.
230. The underlying mandate for the common-law enforcement is the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act specifically reserves the common-law method as an alternative. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 2008).
231. Sister-state judgments are enforced under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (UEFJA). TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon
2008). The Act requires (1) the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenti-
cated under federal or Texas law, and (2) notice to be sent to the judgment debtor from the
clerk or the judgment creditor. Id. H§ 35.003-.005. The judgment debtor may (1) move to
stay enforcement if grounds exist under the law of Texas or the rendering state, and (2)
challenge enforcement along traditional full faith and credit grounds such as the rendering
state's lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Id. §§ 35.006, 35.003.
Foreign-country judgments for money are enforced under the Uniform Foreign Country
Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 36.001-.008 (Vernon 2008). Like the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment
creditor to file a copy of the foreign-country judgment that has been authenticated under
federal or Texas law, with notice to the debtor provided either by the clerk or the creditor.
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36.007 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly reserves
the right of enforcement of non-money judgments under traditional, non-
statutory standards,232 along with similar acts for arbitration awards, 233
child custody,234 and child support.235 Federal judgments may be en-
forced in any other federal district as local judgments,236 but may also be
enforced as sister-state judgments in Texas state courts.
The Survey period's one notable Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (UEFJA) case is Jonsson v. Rand Racing, L.L.C., where
the plaintiff sought enforcement of a default judgment from the Califor-
nia Labor Commission. 237 Niclas Jonsson filed his claim in the California
agency for unpaid wages for his work as a race car driver. When the
defendant Rand failed to respond, the California agency issued a default
judgment, which Jonsson then sought to enforce in Collin County, Texas.
The state district court rejected UEFJA enforcement, finding that Rand
had not submitted itself to California jurisdiction.238 The Dallas Court of
Appeals upheld the denial, emphasizing that Rand's telephone message
to the California agency that disputed the claim did not constitute a gen-
eral appearance. 239
Ponder Research Group, LLP v. Aquatic Navigation, Inc.240 is a would-
be UEFJA case that provides an interesting twist on foreign judgment
enforcement-start your enforcement action in the original forum.
Texas-based Ponder sued Florida-based Aquatic over a failed business
relationship, bringing claims in contract and fraud in federal court in Fort
Worth.241 The court granted Aquatic's motion to dismiss most of Pon-
der's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction but retained some fraud
claims over Aquatic's owner, defendant Brian Coffin.242 In reaching this
Id. §§ 36.0041-.0043. The judgment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement, or
sixty days if "domiciled in a foreign country," with a twenty-day extension available for
good cause. Id. at § 36.0044. Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA explicitly states ten
grounds for non-recognition-three mandatory and seven discretionary. Id. § 36.005.
Briefly stated, the mandatory grounds are (1) lack of an impartial tribunal, (2) lack of
personal jurisdiction, and (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 36.005(a). The dis-
cretionary grounds for non-recognition are that the foreign action (1) involved inadequate
notice, (2) "was obtained by fraud," (3) violates Texas public policy, (4) is contrary to
another final judgment, (5) is contrary to the parties' agreement (e.g., a contrary forum
selection clause), (6) was in an inconvenient forum, and (7) is not from a country granting
reciprocal enforcement rights. Id. § 36.005(b). The UFCMJRA also provides for stays. Id.
§ 36.007.
232. TEX. Cv. PRiAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.008 (Vernon 2008); see generally Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (comity as discretionary grounds for recognizing and enforc-
ing foreign-country judgments).
233. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. H§ 1-307 (2006); Texas International Arbitra-
tion Act, TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (Vernon 2005).
234. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.303 (Vernon 2008).
235. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.601.
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
237. 270 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
238. Id. at 322-23.
239. Id. at 325.
240. No. 4:09-CV-322-Y, 2009 WL 2868456 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2009).
241. Id. at *1-3.
242. Id. at *3-11.
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conclusion, the court also dismissed Ponder's action for declaratory judg-
ment in which it sought a declaration that any judgment resulting from
the Texas case would be enforceable against defendants in Florida. 243
The court held that it could "not make such an abstract
pronouncement. "244
The Survey period included two foreign-country judgment cases, reach-
ing opposite but correct results on jurisdiction. In Naves v. National West-
ern Life Insurance Co., the plaintiff obtained a default judgment in Brazil
against National Western for the death of one of its insured, who died in
Brazil two months after acquiring the policy. 2 4 5 Beneficiary Naves then
sought enforcement in Texas under the Uniform Foreign Country Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA). The trial court sustained the
defendant's objection to Brazilian jurisdiction, and the Austin Court of
Appeals affirmed.246 It is notable that the court of appeals did not hold
that National Western was not amenable to Brazilian jurisdiction; after
all, it had sold a life insurance policy to a resident. Instead, the court of
appeals held that the plaintiff had not obtained proper service under Bra-
zilian law.2 4 7 This is a good lesson for lawyers representing judgment
debtors-whether the original forum is a sister state or a foreign country,
do not overlook jurisdictional defenses under the judgment forum's law.
The other UFCMJRA case, Beluga Chartering B.V. v. Timber S.A.,
reached the opposite conclusion, that is, the court denied the defendant's
jurisdictional objection. 248 In Beluga, however, the defendant was ob-
jecting to Texas jurisdiction for the enforcement of a Uruguayan judg-
ment. The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding that the UFCMJRA "does not require personal jurisdic-
tion over a judgment debtor in Texas as a prerequisite for enforcing a
foreign country judgment in Texas." 249
The Survey period also included four preclusion cases. In re Chenault
involved a wrongful death suit filed in Texas, contrary to the orders of a
Michigan probate court.250 Richard Chenault died in a plane crash in
Lake Michigan. The Michigan probate court appointed his wife Janet as
his personal representative and appointed Richard's ex-wife Cheryl as the
conservator of Richard's minor daughter Kayla. When Cheryl ignored
the Michigan court's instructions and filed a wrongful death action in
Bexar County, the Michigan court removed her as Kayla's conservator
243. Id. at *12.
244. Id.
245. No. 03-08-00525-CV, 2009 WL 2900755, *1 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 10, 2009, no
pet.).
246. Id. at *1.
247. Id. at *2-5.
248. 294 S.W.3d 300, 302, 305 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
249. Id. at 305 (citing Haaksman v. Diamond Offshore (Bermuda), Ltd., 260 S.W.3d
476, 479-80 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)).
250. No. 04-09-00303-CV, 2009 WL 2525442, *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 19,
2009, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
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and held her in contempt.251 Cheryl nonetheless pursued the Texas ac-
tion, and Janet intervened, seeking dismissal. The trial court rejected Ja-
net's objection to Cheryl's prosecution of Richard's wrongful death suit,
but the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds of full
faith and credit for the Michigan's court's holding, which Cheryl had not
appealed there.252
In other preclusion cases, Texas federal and state courts, respectively,
granted full faith and credit to a Wisconsin judgment that barred a bank-
ruptcy discharge in Texas2 5 3 and an Illinois divorce decree to carry out a
marital property division.254 In a separate category applying the doctrine
of preclusion, not full faith and credit, a Texas federal court granted sum-
mary judgment to defendant employers in regard to the plaintiff's unpaid
overtime claim that had been decided by the Texas Workforce
Commission.255
IV. CONCLUSION
As pointed out in the introduction to this Article, Texas litigation offers
valuable insight into American and international conflict-of-laws issues
because of its size, its commerce, and its location. The result is a range of
cases coming to Texas courts that illustrate and sometimes contradict na-
tional trends. In spite of Texas's value as a conflicts laboratory, conclu-
sions are difficult to reach when studying any one year or survey period.
One reason is the anecdotal nature of the case sampling that occurs each
year. A second reason is the nature of these annual Survey articles, as-
sessing the more noteworthy cases and not necessarily quantifying the
significant number of conflict-of-laws, personal jurisdiction, choice-of-
law, and foreign judgments cases that occur in Texas every year. That
quantification requires more research and analysis than this Survey en-
deavor permits. Nonetheless, some conclusions are possible if readers
bear in mind that these conclusions are based on the authors' somewhat
anecdotal experience in compiling this information during this Survey pe-
riod and in past years.
One issue that the authors have examined is the growth or decline in
contractually based determinations of jurisdiction, venue, and choice of
law. That is, has the use of forum clauses and choice-of-law clauses had
an effect on the need to litigate these issues? Two effects are conceivable:
251. Id. at *1-2.
252. Id. at *3-5.
253. Schnolis v. Kosobud (In re Kosobud), No. 08-36581, 2009 WL 2524598, at *1
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2009).
254. Sill v. White, No. 04-08-00324-CV, 2009 WL 1017708, at *1 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Apr. 15, 2009, no pet.).
255. Thakkar v. Balasuriya, No. H-09-0841, 2009 WL 2996727, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9,
2009). The court had earlier denied summary judgment on the grounds that state agency
decisions, unreviewed by state courts, are not entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at *3. On
the defendants' motion to reconsider, the court vacated its earlier order and held that the
Texas Workforce Commission ruling was entitled to res judicata and collateral estoppel
under the common law. Id. at *4-8.
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an increase in litigation as these issues become sophisticated, or a de-
crease if successful drafting made these issues routine. The results are
unclear. This 2009 Survey period included a total of ten forum clause
cases, four successfully designating Texas, 256 and mixed results for six fo-
rum clauses pointing to other states or countries.257 In contrast, the three
Survey periods from 2002 through 2004 produced a total of ten cases, or
an average of about three a year.2 5 8 The results for choice-of-law clauses
do not show an increase. This 2009 Survey period produced three cases
resting on choice-of-law clauses, compared to three cases in 2002,259 two
cases in 2003,260 and six cases in 2004.261 This comparison is drawn from
too small a sample to reach any conclusions and is perhaps more indica-
tive of the random number of cases occurring during each Survey period.
A second assessment is judicial skill in applying the most significant
relationship test and related rules from the Restatement. In 2004, one of
the authors of this Article published a twenty-five year study of 119 Texas
state and federal court decisions, examining the tendency to over-empha-
size governmental interests.262 The 2004 article concluded that in twenty-
one percent of the decisions, Texas state and federal courts mistakenly
applied a California-type governmental interest analysis instead of the
correct balancing test under the Restatement. 263 In the 2009 Survey pe-
riod and recent Survey periods, none of the choice-of-law decisions
makes this error.
A third assessment is Texas courts' alignment with national doctrines.
That is not to say that alignment is necessarily correct, but merely to note
the coincidence of Texas law with national trends. For choice of law,
Texas follows the nation's majority approach, the most significant rela-
tionship test from the Restatement. 264 As noted in the prior paragraph,
Texas courts are applying it accurately. The issues of personal jurisdiction
and interstate judgments are governed by the U.S. Constitution, theoreti-
cally allowing for little deviation.265 There is no sign of deviation for
256. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
258. See James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 56 SMU L. REV. 1283,
1285-87, 1308-09 (three cases) [hereinafter 2002 Conflicts]; James P. George & Anna K.
Teller, Conflict of Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 719, 721-22, 737-38 (four cases) [hereinafter 2003
Conflicts]; James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 58 SMU L. REV. 679, 681,
696 (three cases) [hereinafter 2004 Conflicts].
259. See 2002 Conflicts, supra note 258, at 1320-24.
260. See 2003 Conflicts, supra note 258, at 745-46.
261. See 2004 Conflicts, supra note 258, at 701-03.
262. James P. George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analyses: Judicial Misuse of Govern-
mental Interests in the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 REV. LrrG. 489, 491-92,
531 (2004).
263. Id. at 492-93.
264. As of 2009, nineteen states use the Restatement for choice of law in both torts and
contracts cases. See Symeonides, supra note 188, at 5-6. A total of twenty-eight states use
the Restatement for torts or contracts or both. Id.
265. See generally Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (due process governs
personal jurisdiction); see also U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (full faith
and credit governs interstate judgment enforcement).
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judgments, although the vast case law surrounding personal jurisdiction
does permit variances among the states. On issues such as Internet-based
jurisdiction, Texas follows the national trend of using the sliding-scale
doctrine of passive-to-active websites. 266 The only aberrational sign in
recent Texas caselaw is the Moki Mac decision in which the Texas Su-
preme Court seemed to violate the United States Supreme Court's cau-
tion about talismanic or bright-line approaches to the minimum contacts
test.2 6 7 To its credit, the Dallas Court of Appeals appeared to take excep-
tion to the supreme court's ruling on remand.268
Apart from these anecdotal observations, several summaries can be
made about this Survey period. Texas courts enforced Texas forum
clauses in four cases in which business agreements led to tort litigation in
Texas;269 issued differing opinions in two cases considering whether a
nonresident's singular contract to be performed in Texas could establish
jurisdiction;270 upheld general jurisdiction in three cases;271 found stream-
of-commerce jurisdiction in two patent cases;272 reached opposite juris-
dictional results in two multi-district litigation cases, the difference being
a nationwide long-arm statute;273 considered seventeen commercial cases
with long-arm issues but only two tort cases, both of which denied juris-
diction;274 considered a total of five Internet cases, four rejecting jurisdic-
tion;275 considered five parallel litigation actions, all five deferring to
first-filed actions in other states;276 provided Restatement choice-of-law
analyses in two contracts cases, both involving insurance coverage,277 in
two commercial tort cases, 278 and in three non-commercial tort cases;279
and issued routine judgments from both sister states and foreign
countries.280
266. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 155-57 (4th ed. 2005).
267. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing Moki Mac River Expedi-
tions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007)). See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 485-86 (1985) ("We share the Court of Appeals' broader concerns and therefore
reject any talismanic jurisdictional formulas; 'the facts of each case must [always] be
weighed' in determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and
substantial justice."' (quoting Kulko v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978))).
268. See Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 270 S.W.3d 799,801-04 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2008, no pet.).
269. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 30-31 & 80-84 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 58-84 and accompanying text. Of the four Internet cases rejecting
jurisdiction, three were defamation claims. See supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 166-79 and accompanying text. The 2008 Survey period included
eight contract choice of law cases. See Stephanie K. Marshall, Wm. Frank Carroll, & James
P. George, Conflict of Laws, 62 SMU L. REv. 1021, 1039-43 (2009).
278. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 237-55 and accompanying text.
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